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Japan’s security policy, the US-Japan alliance, and the ‘war on terror’: 
incrementalism confirmed or radical leap? 
  
 
CHRISTOPHER W. HUGHES 
 
 
Japan’s response to the ‘war on terror’, in the form of the despatch of the JSDF 
to the Indian Ocean and Iraq, has given policy-makers and academic analysts 
grounds for believing that Japan is becoming a more assertive military power 
in support of its US ally. This article argues that JSDF despatch does not 
necessarily mark a divergence from Japan’s previous security path over the 
short term. This is because its policy-makers have continued to hedge around 
commitments to the US through careful constitutional framing of JSDF 
missions and capabilities, allowing it opt-out clauses in future conflicts, and 
because it has also sought to pursue economic and alternative diplomatic 
policies in responding to terrorism and WMD proliferation in the Middle East. 
However, at the same it this article argues that Japan has established 
important precedents for expanded JSDF missions in the ‘war on terror’, and 
that over the medium to longer terms these are likely to be applied to the 
bilateral context of the US-Japan security treaty in East Asia, and to push 
Japan towards becoming a more active military power through participation in 
US-led multinational ‘coalitions of the willing’ in East Asia and globally.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The speed, substance and significance of Japan’s response to 11 September  
 
Is Japan becoming a more active military player, a more reliable US alliance partner, 
and, as some would dare say, a more ‘normal’ big power in regional and global security 
affairs? Japan’s response to 11 September and the ‘war on terror’ has further fuelled the 
ongoing debate on its security policy, and has given certain policy-makers and academic 
analysts grounds for believing that Japan is indeed becoming a more assertive military 
power (Miller 2002; Atlantic Council of the United States et al 2002; Okamoto 2002).1  
 The Government of Japan (GOJ) swiftly passed an Anti-Terrorism Special 
Measures Law (ATSML) by 29 October 2001 (subsequently revised four times between 
2002 and 2004), enabling the despatch from November that year onwards of Japan Self-
defence Forces (JSDF) units to support the campaign in Afghanistan.2 Maritime Self-
defence Force (MSDF) flotillas (consisting of fuel supply and transport ships and two 
destroyers), in combination with Air Self-defence Force (ASDF) transport aircraft have 
been charged with providing refuelling and logistical transport, medical and 
maintenance support to US and other forces in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. As of 
May 2004, the MSDF has supplied fuel to ships from the navies of the US, UK, 
Germany, New Zealand, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Canada and Greece; and 
transported Thai army equipment for reconstruction activities to Afghanistan. The 
JSDF’s range of action has been defined as including not just the sea and airspace of the 
Indian Ocean itself, but in addition the land territory of the states located along the coast 
of the Indian Ocean and the supply lines stretching back to Japan, Australia and the US. 
 Japan’s Diet then passed on 26 July 2003 a Law Concerning Special Measures on 
Humanitarian and Reconstruction (LCSMHRA), which has enabled Ground Self-
defence Force (GSDF) and ASDF despatch since December of the same year to provide 
logistical support for US and coalition forces in Iraq and in the surrounding Persian Gulf 
states. The 600-strong GSDF unit has conducted reconstruction activities in Samawah, 
southwest of Basra, while the ASDF has flown supplies from Kuwait to the GSDF and 
transported US troops from Kuwait to Iraq. 
 Japan has certainly exhibited in the past a pattern of international and regional crises 
precipitating important changes in its security policy. The GOJ, as a result of its 
perceived failure to respond to US and international demands for a ‘human contribution’ 
during the Gulf War of 1990-91, eventually despatched minesweepers to the Gulf after 
the cessation of hostilities and then passed an International Peace Cooperation Law in 
June 1992 to allow for SDF despatch on limited UN PKO missions (Hook 1996: 86-90; 
Yamaguchi 1992; Inoguchi 1991; George 1999; Woolley 2000). Similarly, the North 
Korean nuclear crisis of 1994 indicated the US-Japan alliance’s fundamental lack of 
political and military operability to respond to regional contingencies (Hughes 1996; 
Christensen 1999; Heginbotham and Samuels 1998). This created momentum for the 
revision of the Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation from September 1997 
onwards, and then the passage through the National Diet in May 1999 of legislation 
(known in Japan as the Shūhen Jitaihō) to enable the SDF to provide logistical support 
to US forces in order to defend Japan in the event of regional contingencies around its 
periphery, or Shūhen.  
 Nevertheless, even given this track record of external crises and incremental 
expansions in Japanese security policy, many Japan watchers—not only foreign, but also 
domestic—have been taken aback at the unprecedented speed and the substance of the 
Japanese reaction to events, all indicating a possible major shift in its military posture. 
JSDF activities under the GOJ’s separate Basic Plans for despatch devised in line with 
the ATSML and LCSMHRA, indicate the expansion of Japan’s military security role 
beyond previous legal frameworks. JSDF missions in the Indian Ocean and Iraq 
represent the first time in the post-war period that Japan’s military has officially been 
despatched overseas during an ongoing conflict; and Japan has taken the decision in Iraq 
to put GSDF ‘boots on the ground’ for the first time in a conflict situation. The ATSML 
and LCSMHRA, although designating limits upon the geographical range of JSDF 
logistical operations in support of the US and other states, at the same time provide two 
forms of legal framework which expand the JSDF’s geographical scope of action far 
beyond that of the Shūhen Jitaihō; enable new GSDF missions on the land territory of 
states included within the geographical range of the ATSML and LCSMHRA; and 
indicate that in the future, under new laws, the despatch of the JSDF in support of US 
forces could become almost limitless geographically. In addition, the ATSML and 
LCSMHRA have expanded the functional scope of JSDF despatch— differing from the 
IPCL and Shūhen Jitaihō in that they allow the JSDF use of weapons to protect not only 
the lives and bodies of individual JSDF personnel and their units, but also those who 
‘have come under their control’, which has been read as meaning wounded personnel 
from US and other forces, and refugees from the Afghan and Iraqi conflicts. 
 Japan in responding to 11 September has certainly revealed its potential as a 
decisive and proactive military power. However, there is still no consensus among 
policy-makers and commentators with regard to exactly what type of precedent the 
ATSML and LCSMHRA set for the overall future trajectory of Japan’s security policy. 
It might be possible to interpret the new laws and JSDF operations as a series of one-off 
actions, produced by the extraordinary circumstances of the post-11 September security 
environment, Japan’s need to demonstrate support for the US for fear of losing its ally’s 
assistance against a resurgent North Korea nuclear crisis, and Prime Minister Koizumi’s 
bold but unusual leadership in committing Japanese support (Midford 2003; Sato 2003: 
4). Hence, the ATSML and LCSMHRA may not lead to any fundamental deviation from 
the traditional pattern of the incremental expansion of Japan’s security role both 
independently and in conjunction with the US, which still leaves in place the 
constitutional and other prohibitions on the use of Japanese military power. Japan’s 
attempts to limit the type of capabilities and missions prescribed for the JSDF, including, 
as investigated below, Aegis despatch and JSDF non-combat zone operations, can be 
seen as one indication of its continued ultra-caution about committing military forces to 
overseas operations.  
 For others, as mentioned above, Japan’s recent actions represent a major 
incremental leap in its security policy that could take it to the point-of-no-return, or 
‘crossing the Rubicon’, in terms of breaking with its past traditions. This is due to the 
fact that, even though the ATSML and LCSMHRA have not challenged openly many of 
the constitutional prohibitions on Japan’s exercise of military force and the role of the 
JSDF, they have established de facto precedents of cooperation with the US and other 
states in the case of the global ‘war on terror’ which mean that Japan will be obliged 
eventually to apply the same levels of cooperation to bilateral security cooperation with 
the US in other regional and global crises (McCormack 2001; Sakamoto 2002). In 
particular, Japan’s support for the forces of the US and other states, which themselves 
were operating under the invocation of the principles of individual and collective self-
defence respectively, has been interpreted as necessarily a de facto act of collective self-
defence and breach of constitutional prohibitions. 
 Given the surprise at the substance of Japan’s response to the war on terrorism, and 
the divided debate over the exact significance of Japanese actions, the objective of this 
article is to investigate in depth the question as to whether it represents a confirmation of 
traditional patterns of security policy or a turning point and abandonment of 
incrementalism.  
 On the one hand, this article argues that in the short term the ATSML and 
LCSMHRA should not be overestimated in their significance. This is because the 
continued adherence of GOJ policy-makers to anti-militaristic principles or norms, their 
inherent fear of entrapment in US military conflicts, and the fact that they do not fully 
share the US vision of ‘the axis of evil’, mean that they have employed the same degree 
of ingenuity in framing the ATSML and LCSMHRA as in the Shūhen Jitaihō so as to 
provide them with opt-out clauses in future conflict scenarios. GOJ policy-makers have 
ensured that most of the de jure restrictions on the despatch of the JSDF remain in place 
and could, with the necessary political determination, be reasserted as de facto 
restrictions—all indicating that US cannot expect automatic support from its ally in 
other conflict situations beyond the limited military assistance already supplied in the 
Afghan campaign and in Iraqi reconstruction. Furthermore, Japan’s actions in other non-
military areas of security indicate that sections of the GOJ are still attempting to follow 
conceptions of comprehensive security and to act as an alternative form of ‘global 
civilian power’ (Funabashi 1991-1992). 
 On the other hand, this article argues that, despite the caution of Japan’s policy-
makers, the ATSML and LCSMHRA do set potentially radical precedents for Japanese 
security policy over the medium to long terms, and strengthen the hand of the 
‘normalisers’ in the policy system. Japan in participating in the ‘war on terror’ is 
becoming inured to the habits of multilateral cooperation, thereby providing the GOJ 
with the political confidence and the JSDF with operational experience to take part in 
future US-led multinational ‘coalitions of the willing’ and overseas expeditions, and 
marking a decline in Japan’s traditional post-war reluctance to become involved in 
overseas contingencies. The expansion of the geographical and functional scope of the 
JSDF could come to be applied to the bilateral domain of the US-Japan security treaty, 
as the GOJ finds it hard to maintain the deliberate political and constitutional ‘firewalls’ 
that it has erected to demarcate the support that it can provide to the US in the Afghan 
conflict under the ATSML and LCSMHRA from the support that it can provide to the 
US in a regional contingency under Shūhen Jitaihō and the bilateral security treaty. 
Japan’s participation in the ‘war on terror’ thus points to a further incremental jump in 
the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance as the key determinant in the inter-state 
regional security order in East Asia. 
 In order to put forward this argument, this article is divided into four major sections. 
The first two sections respectively examine in more depth the policy-making 
motivations and legal frameworks that lie behind Japan’s response to the ‘war on terror’ 
and its despatch of the JSDF to support the Afghan campaign and Iraqi reconstruction. 
The third section then draws out the combined significance of these two examples of 
JSDF despatch by assessing how far they represent a divergence from or confirmation of 
past patterns of security behaviour in terms of Japan’s degree of willingness to commit 
itself to the military support of its US ally and the international community. This section 
then further pursues the question of incrementalism or radicalism in Japan’s security 
policy by juxtaposing its military role in the ‘war on terror’ against its non-military role 
and other diplomatic activity to determine how far it may be moving away from past 
traditions of security. The fourth section then completes the discussion by examining 
and speculating in what ways Japan’s participation in the ‘war on terror’ has come to 
open up potential new multilateral frameworks for its utilisation of military power; how 
the ‘war on terror’ is likely to affect new developments in Japan-US military cooperation 
within the context of the bilateral security treaty in East Asia; and how these bilateral 
and multilateral frameworks are likely to influence each other and Japan’s future 
security path.  
 
Japanese policy-making and JSDF despatch to the Indian Ocean 
 
Japan’s key security policy-makers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the 
Japan Defence Agency (JDA), the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and 
services of the JSDF were concerned to contribute to the US and international 
community’s campaign against terrorism in Afghanistan from for a variety of 
motivations. Japanese policy-makers were certainly concerned that they would face 
gaiatsu (external pressure), similar to the time of the Gulf War, from its US ally to 
provide a human and military contribution to the international coalition, and that failure 
to respond could again jeopardise the political basis of the Japan-US alliance (September 
2001, incidentally, marking the 50th anniversary of the signing of the original bilateral 
security treaty). However, it also the case that gaiatsu only proved effective because it 
worked in combination with and amplified preexisting Japanese sentiment which reviled 
the terrorist attacks on the US and had increasingly advocated a greater role for Japan to 
contribute to the stability of international society. The events of 11 September confirmed 
for many Japanese the enhanced dangers to international society of transnational 
terrorism that had first been demonstrated by Japan’s own experience of the ‘hyper-
terrorism’ of the Aum Shinrikyō  sarin attacks on the Tokyo subway in 1995 (Hughes 
1998). The opinion polls taken in reaction to the debates on 11 September indicated 
generally widespread public support for the despatch of the JSDF to provide logistical 
support for the US and other states.3 
 Therefore, much of Japan’s policy-making community and its citizenry were 
predisposed to the overseas despatch of the JSDF and support for the US and 
international community ‘war on terror’, so marking a major contrast from the time of 
the Gulf War. Nevertheless, Japanese policy-makers’ own anti-militaristic norms and 
general wariness of entanglement in US and international military contingencies meant 
that they also prepared careful political and legal fallback positions to allow Japan to 
circumscribe current and future military cooperation. This potential radicalism, but also 
inherent caution, among Japan’s policy-makers in responding to 11 September was 
demonstrated by their design of the provisions of the ATSML. 
 
Japan’s design of the ATSML 
 
MOFA, the JDA, and the LDP were all in accord from the start that Japan’s principal 
contribution, in line with US and international expectations, should be in the form of 
JSDF despatch and at least match that of the Shūhen Jitaihō in its functional scope, and 
thus include activities such as refuelling and logistical supply for US forces. Sections of 
the JDA and the LDP initially proposed that the GOJ should utilise the revised Japan-US 
Defence Guidelines and Shūhen Jitaihō as readily available and extendable framework 
to provide support for the US (Tamura 2001: 4; Asahi Shimbun, 16 September 2001: 4). 
 MOFA, and other elements of the LDP and JDA, though, moved to block these 
moves, preferring instead that the GOJ should enact a new legal framework for JSDF 
despatch. MOFA’s opposition to the application of the Shūhen Jitaihō was derived from 
a number of reasons. Firstly, the revised Defence Guidelines were regarded as overly 
restrictive of JSDF activities in the sense that the rationale for their activation was a 
military contingency that if left unaddressed would directly affect Japan’s security, a 
difficult case to argue in the case of Afghanistan.4 Moreover, Japan’s government had 
stated since 1999 that the Indian Ocean was not envisaged as within the scope of the 
Guidelines.5 Furthermore, the GOJ’s application of the Guidelines, which limit JSDF 
support for the US to sea and airspace, would have effectively ruled out MOFA’s hopes 
for possible GSDF despatch to Pakistan to provide medical assistance to US forces and 
refugees; viewed by the ministry as the most visible way for Japan to ‘fly the flag’ in 
support of its US ally (Yachi 2002: 12). Secondly, the revised Defence Guidelines were 
viewed as under-restrictive, in that, if used for the Afghan campaign, this would set a 
precedent for JSDF despatch that would undermine previous GOJ attempts to retain 
control over the geographical and functional scope of its military and so heighten the 
risks of entrapment in US regional and global military contingencies (Asahi Shimbun, 16 
September 2001: 4). 
 
Legal justifications and the UN: shifting from Article 9 to the Preamble 
 
GOJ policy-makers also exercised considerable ingenuity in their interpretation of 
constitutional prohibitions in order to justify JSDF activities under the ATSML, while at 
the same time building into these interpretations limits to the precedents that could 
trigger a Japanese commitment to other military contingencies in support of the US. 
Japan’s search for a legal framework to allow JSDF despatch was complicated by its 
need to avoid any direct breach of its self-imposed constitutional prohibition on the 
exercise of the right of collective self-defence. The US and NATO allies justified 
respectively their involvement in the Afghan campaign on the rights of individual and 
collective self-defence, rather than extant UN resolutions (Greenwood 2002: 311-312). 
Japan could have chosen to invoke the right of individual self-defence as a basis for 
JSDF despatch due to the number of fatalities of Japanese citizens on 11 September, but 
this would have then mandated a combat role for its military. Japan’s exercise of the 
right of collective self-defence was not an option constitutionally. Japan’s preference 
instead has been for a non-combat role that relies on the right neither of individual or 
collective self-defence, but is predicated on relevant UN resolutions. 
 Japan has stressed UN resolutions that identify the 11 September attacks as a threat 
to international peace in general and that call on all UN members, and by implication 
Japan as well, to take steps to counter terrorism. Japan has been able to link this UN 
legitimacy with its own constitution to legitimise JSDF despatch by switching emphasis 
from Article 9 (the so-called ‘peace clause’) to the Preamble. The Preamble states that 
Japan should work with international society for the preservation of peace, and thus the 
GOJ has been able to use the Preamble to argue that it should support the UN as 
international society’s highest representative and its relevant resolutions to counter 
terrorism. In turn, Japan has bridged UN resolutions, its constitution, and support 
provided for the US by emphasising that its support is not just for the US but for ‘other 
concerned states’ and the international community as a whole to expunge terrorism. 
 
Japan and Iraq despatch 
 
Japan’s policy-makers in the case of the ATSML and Afghan campaign, therefore, can 
be seen as preoccupied with the creation of frameworks to expand but also retain close 
control over JSDF missions for fear of becoming sucked against their will into US 
military strategy. Likewise, Japan’s despatch of the JSDF to Iraq displayed similar 
motivations and caution.  
 
The ‘axis of evil’, the US-Japan alliance, and state-building 
 
Japan, as in the case of other developed states and allies of the US, has displayed 
varying degrees of ambivalence about the war in Iraq and its aftermath. Its policy-
makers are known to have questioned the legitimacy of the war in the absence of clear 
UN mandates; the necessity of military action and regime change, as compared to 
economic power and engagement, in countering Iraq’s alleged WMD programme; Iraq’s 
connections with 11 September and transnational terrorism, and the whole concept of the 
‘axis of evil; the limitations of US capabilities and commitment for stabilising post-war 
Iraq; and the risks of Japanese military entrapment in US military adventurism in Iraq 
and elsewhere in the Middle East. However, in the final calculation, Japan’s 
ambivalence has been overridden by concerns about the proliferation of WMD, and the 
alliance imperative of demonstrating support for the US in Iraq in order to counter the 
resurgent nuclear threat from North Korea (Kamiya 2004: 14-15). Moreover, Japan, 
despite its doubts about the US’s long term ability to commit itself to Iraq, and the 
failure of the US to involve the UN from an early enough stage, does take the task of 
state-building in Iraq very seriously, and believes that through JSDF despatch and 
economic assistance it can play an important security and reconstruction role.  
 Japan’s policy-makers ruled out from the start any direct support for the war in Iraq. 
Prime Minister Koizumi instead expressed ‘understanding’ for the US-led military 
action, and pledged the extension of the ATSML and JSDF deployments in the Indian 
Ocean in order to free up US forces for Iraqi operations. However, in the run-up to 
President George W. Bush’s declaration of the end of major combat hostilities in May 
2003, Japanese policy-makers had already become engaged in efforts to contribute to 
post-war reconstruction. Japan sent fact-finding missions to Iraq and the region in the 
Spring of 2003. The GOJ next waited upon the passing of UN resolution 1483 calling 
upon member states to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq, and then succeeded in passing 
the LCSMHRA through the Diet by July in 2003 with less than five weeks of 
deliberation.  
 Japan’s final commitment to JSDF despatch was held up by Lower House Diet 
elections in November 2003, during which Prime Minister Koizumi watched for any 
adverse public reaction to the prospect of Iraq despatch, and by the general deterioration 
of the security situation in Iraq from mid-2003 onwards. Japan also spent a long time on 
determining the region within Iraq for GSDF despatch, rejecting US requests for 
deployments to Balad in support of US troops north of Baghdad as too risk-laden, and 
even considering the relatively stable Kurdish-controlled north. Japan decided upon 
Samawah in November, but bomb attacks upon Italian troops in Nasiriyah, around 100 
kilometres north of Samawah, pushed back plans for despatch to early 2004.  
 
Circumventing constitutional prohibitions in the LCSMHRA 
 
Japan’s government in enacting the LCSMHRA and committing itself to JSDF despatch 
put forward a dual rationale. Prime Minister Koizumi stated upon the announcement of 
the Basic Plan for JSDF despatch under the LCSMHRA that the commitment of the 
JSDF was essential for maintaining confidence in the US-Japan alliance, and thus the 
essential mechanism for maintaining Japan’s own security. At the same time, the 
rationale of alliance preservation was presented in parallel with the need to assist the 
international community’s efforts for the reconstruction of Iraq. Koizumi in his 
statement deliberately conflated the US and UK with the international community, 
thereby conveying the impression of a broad based coalition on a par with the previous 
campaign in Afghanistan. Moreover, the LCSMHRA itself was predicated on the basis 
of UN resolutions 1458 and 1511, thus lending legitimacy to Japan’s participation in the 
US-led campaign, even though the degree of legitimacy conferred by these resolutions 
was actually relatively weak. Furthermore, Koizumi employed the same circumvention 
of constitutional prohibitions, as in the case of Afghanistan, in order to link Japan’s 
support essentially directed towards its bilateral ally with the domestically vaunted 
legitimacy of the UN and its own constitution. Koizumi in his statement stressed the 
constitutionality of JSDF despatch, but chose to read out, not Article 9, the previous 
arbiter of Japan’s security policy, but instead the Preamble.6 Hence, once again, Japan 
had succeeded in extending support for its US ally in the ‘war on terror’, without 
breaching the constitutional principle of the non-exercise of collective self-defence, and 
by wrapping up its actions in the legitimacy of UN multilateralism, however tenuous that 
may have been in the case of immediate post-war Iraq. 
 
Implications of Afghan and Iraq despatch for Japan’s security policy 
 
Japan attempting to hedge against entrapment 
 
Japan’s design of JSDF despatch to the Afghan campaign and to Iraq demonstrates 
considerable subtlety, and, consequently, the implications of these activities for its 
overall security policy direction also need to be divined with some sophistication. 
Japan’s participation in the ‘war on terror’ does contain some potentially radical 
implications for its security, but this should not be overstated. Japanese policy-makers in 
devising their response to Afghanistan and Iraq have remained highly wary of 
entrapment in US-inspired contingencies worldwide and within the East Asia region, 
and therefore continued to pursue hedging options to limit these risks. Japan has based 
the ATSML and LCSMHRA as the legal frameworks for JSDF despatch upon relevant 
UN resolutions. Moreover, the GOJ has ensured that each JSDF despatch to Afghanistan 
and Iraq is enabled by separate laws. The ATSML and LCSMHRA, although modelled 
on each other, and using the revised Defence Guidelines as a form of legislative 
template, are in turn entirely separate form the legal framework of the US-Japan security 
treaty. Japan in using UN resolutions as the overt legal trigger for JSDF despatch has 
thus created opt-out clauses to escape involvement in US-led operations that it does not 
interpret as having a strong UN mandate, as in the case of the Iraq war. Japan’s use of 
separate laws for each JSDF despatch has erected a set of ‘firewalls’ between each 
mission, so enabling it to simultaneously push forward but also limit on a case-by-case 
basis the extent of support that it should provide to the US under the ATSML, the 
LCSMHRA, and the US-Japan security treaty. Japan’s intention to prevent any type of 
open-ended commitment to the Afghan and Iraq campaigns is shown also by the limited, 
although extendable, time frames on the expiry of both laws (set to run for a standard 
period of one year, and then subject to Diet review and revision), and the need for Diet 
ex post facto approval of despatch.  
 Japan’s continued caution in committing its military forces to overseas action is 
demonstrated further by the types of missions and capabilities chosen for the JSDF. The 
JSDF under the ATSML and LCSMHRA are deployed in non-combat zones (sentō  kōi 
ga okanawarete orazu) to limit the risks of embroilment in a conflict. Japan found the 
distinction between combat and non-combat zones easier to make in the case of the 
Afghan campaign, with the MSDF as its principal form of deployment, and the GSDF 
ultimately not sent to Pakistan. In the case of an Iraq ridden with insurgency, and despite 
its efforts to find the safest zone possible in Samawah, this distinction has been much 
harder for the GOJ to sell. The GSDF has thus had to endure greater risks in its Iraq 
mission, especially as the security deterioration around Samawah has further 
deteriorated in 2004. But it has limited these risks by essentially shutting itself up in its 
fortified camp since mid-2004.  
 JSDF capabilities in the Afghan campaign and Iraq have also remained limited, 
thereby limiting also the risks of becoming co-opted into combat duties. The GSDF in 
Iraq is far more heavily armed than on any previous mission. In addition to its usual 
equipment of pistols, rifles and machine guns, it has access to recoilless rifles, light anti-
tank munitions, and wheeled armoured personnel carriers. But these are capabilities 
really only useful for self-defence, and in most cases the GSDF has looked for protection 
from Dutch troops stationed nearby. Japanese policy-makers have demonstrated similar 
caution in the Afghan campaign, refusing to despatch Kongō-class Aegis war-fighting 
system-equipped (AWS) destroyers to the Indian Ocean area in its first deployments in 
November 2001, much to the frustration of the US and the MSDF. The GOJ only 
relented on this decision in December 2001, sending two AWS destroyers in rotation. 
Japanese policy-makers were deeply divided on the issue of Aegis despatch. They 
recognised that the AWS destroyers are the MSDF’s most capable assets and thus 
provide it with maximum flexibility and security in an uncertain theatre of operations. 
But policy-makers, and particularly the older guard of the LDP were concerned that the 
high degree of inter-operability and data-linking systems between MSDF and US Navy 
warships equipped with the AWS might lead to US requests for Japan to deploy its naval 
assets as substitutes for those of the US. This would highlight problems of the exercise 
of collective self-defence and would risk that Japanese forces might become directly 
involved in combat operations.  
 The GOJ eventually took the decision for Aegis despatch only after persistent 
internal pressure from MOFA, the JDA, and the MSDF, all of whom sought to maximise 
the safety of Japanese forces and the degree of visible support for the US-led war effort. 
The despatch also came after the dampening down of hostilities in Afghanistan thereby 
minimising the risks that the JSDF would become involved in combat operations. 
Japanese caution was also seen in the decision not to despatch the GSDF to Pakistan 
under the ATSML. In part this decision was obviated by the relative lack of US 
casualties in the Afghan war and the ability of aid agencies to cope with refugee flows. 
But the government was also influenced by fears that the JSDF could become embroiled 
in land combat operations in the volatile environment of Pakistan. 
 
Japan’s non-military and diplomatic activity and the ‘axis of evil’: divergent policies to 
the US? 
 
In addition to the GOJ’s careful limiting of the degree of its military commitment under 
the ATSML and the LCSMHRA, it has also taken pains to balance this involvement in 
the ‘war on terror’ with other non-military and economic activity. Japan in responding to 
11 September and the commencement of hostilities in Afghanistan launched a vigorous 
diplomatic campaign sending letters and special emissaries throughout September and 
October, including former prime ministers Hashimoto Ryūtarō  and Mori Yoshirō, to 
Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, the Arab League of States 
(states with which Japan has traditionally cultivated close relations since the Oil Shocks 
of the 1970s), Pakistan, India, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, urging these states to support 
the international effort against terrorism (Yachi 2002: 15). On the economic front, Japan, 
in line with UN Resolutions 1267 and 1333, also took measures on 22 September and 26 
October to freeze the assets and restrict the money flows of a total of one hundred and 
eighty-eight individuals and groups related to the Taliban. On 22 September and then on 
16 November, the GOJ decided to provide a total of US$300 million of bilateral 
assistance to Pakistan over the following two years for education, health and poverty 
reduction. The GOJ on 26 October also discontinued its limited sanctions on India and 
Pakistan imposed since May 1998 in response to their nuclear testing activities. Japan’s 
‘assistance to countries surrounding Afghanistan’ also took the form of a total of US$18 
million to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In addition to the emergency humanitarian 
assistance transported by the ASDF and MSDF to Pakistan, as of February 2002 the 
GOJ has provided a total of US$102 million via the UN and other agencies to Afghan 
refugees and a pool of ¥580 million to Japanese non-governmental organisations (NGO) 
for refugee assistance. This Japanese activity then culminated in its recognition on 22 
December of the Interim Authority as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, and the 
hosting in Tokyo of the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to 
Afghanistan on 21-22 January 2002. Japan at the conference pledged up to US$500 
million for rebuilding the government and physical infrastructure of the country, and the 
conference itself raised a total of US$4.5 billion. 
 Japan’s extension of economic assistance clearly complemented the US’s overall 
strategy of seeking to stabilise friendly states around the region of Afghanistan, and in 
this sense was something of a repeat of Japanese assistance provided to Pakistan as a 
‘country bordering on the area of conflict’ to support US Cold War strategy during the 
USSR’s occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s (Hook et al, 2001: 210). At the same 
time, though, the GOJ was engaged in more than just another US-directed exercise in 
burden-sharing (or indeed burden-shifting, given initial Bush administration reluctance 
to engage in ‘nation-building’ in Afghanistan), and its diplomacy and emphasis on the 
use of economic power reflected a degree of divergence in Japanese and US perceptions 
of the most appropriate means to respond to the challenge of al-Qaeda. The GOJ’s 
interest in dealing with immediate humanitarian problems and the reconstruction of the 
Afghan state was motivated by its past patterns of security policy which have viewed 
economic dislocation as root causes of intra- and inter-state security and the generation 
of terrorism (Hughes 1999: 12-25). 
 In the case of Iraq, Japan has also attempted to pursue a twin-track security 
contribution. JSDF despatch has been viewed as vital for a show of alliance unity with 
the US, but the GOJ also sees the GSDF as playing an important role in complementing 
its distribution of economic aid, and is genuinely committed to the task of state-building 
in Iraq. Japan at the International Donors’ Conference on Reconstruction of Iraq in 
October 2003 pledged US$5 billion (US$1.5 billion in grants; and US$3.5 billion in 
ODA loans) disbursed bilaterally and multilaterally, and in cooperation with NGOs. In 
this sense, Japan’s utilisation of economic power in Afghanistan and Iraq represents a 
reconfirmation of its conceptions of comprehensive security, Human Security, and its 
aspirations for the status of a ‘global civilian power’.  
 Moreover, Japan’s energetic diplomatic contribution in the Middle East has 
indicated that, far from totally falling into line with US intentions in the region, it has 
actually been preparing a diplomatic position that could allow it to stand aside from 
future US military actions. The fear has been that Japan’s support for the US in the 
campaign against terrorism and WMD will undermine its role as a relatively neutral 
interlocutor with the Arab and Gulf States; a position carefully built up since the oil 
shocks of the 1970s due to Japan’s heavy reliance on imported oil, and provided to it by 
its status as the only non-Christian major developed power. Japan since 11 September 
has certainly portrayed itself as an intermediary between the West and the Middle East, 
but has possibly been more concerned to exploit this role in order to consolidate its 
position as a friend of Iran and the Arab states (Heginbotham and Samuels 2002). Japan 
has assiduously courted Iran, sending its Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko to Iran in 
April 2002 and January 2004, and despite lining up with the US to express concerns 
about Iran’s possible evasion of IAEA safeguards it has, much to the discomfort of the 
US, sponsored the signing of new deal with Iran for the development of the Azegedan 
oil field. Japan, in addition, remains as one of the principal aid donors to the Palestinian 
Authority. Japan thus continues to count among its key priorities the maintenance of 
good relations and its oil supplies with Iran and the Arab world, all meaning that it may 
be hesitant to support the US in further military action in the region, and most especially 
against Iran, unless this was also supported by other regional powers, substantial 
evidence connecting these states to terrorism, and new UN resolutions.  
 
New horizons for multilateral and US-Japan security cooperation? 
 
Japan in the ‘war on terror’ thus can be seen to have pursued a highly cautious hedging 
strategy militarily and diplomatically to limit the risks of entrapment in US-inspired out 
of area contingencies. Japan is thus still some way from becoming the ‘Britain of the Far 
East’, lined up indefatigably, and perhaps dogmatically, in support of the US. However, 
despite Japan’s attempts to maintain incrementalism in the expansion of its security 
responsibilities, it is the case that its involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq has set crucial 
precedents for JSDF despatch which means that its security policy could be pulled in 
more radical directions in the near future.  
 As noted in the introduction to this article, the JSDF for the first time has been 
despatched during on-going conflicts, and it now has a mandate to use weapons not only 
for the defence of its own personnel but also for US personnel and refugees under its 
charge. The geographical scope of JSDF operations has expanded rapidly from being 
restricted to East Asia over the past fifty years, to now encompass in the past three years 
the sea, air and land space of an area stretching as far as the Middle East. Japan’s new 
found determination for JSDF despatch is also shown by the fact that its plans were not 
derailed by public resistance that might have arisen from the killing of two Japanese 
MOFA officials in Iraq in November 2003, the withdrawal of Spanish troops in 2004, or 
the widely publicised trauma of the kidnappings of Japanese citizens in April 2004 and 
killing of Japanese journalists in May of the same year. 
 Japan’s role in the ‘war on terror’ has also opened up new radical directions for 
JSDF activities in multilateral frameworks and the US-Japan alliance. Japan might be 
able to fulfil an enhanced role in US-centred multilateral operations through an option 
known as collective security. Japan’s policy-makers in devising the ATSML and 
LCSMHRA, as explained in the section above, have been obliged to circumvent 
constitutional prohibitions on the exercise of the right of collective self-defence by 
switching the emphasis of constitutional interpretation from Article 9 to the Preamble. 
Japan’s shift of constitutional interpretation has resulted in the creation, whether 
deliberately or inadvertently, of the same type of collective security option as proposed 
by policy-makes such as Ozawa Ichirō (briefly the leader of the Democratic Party of 
Japan) at the time of the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Ozawa has long posited that greater 
attention should be paid to the Preamble and its emphasis on Japan’s need to contribute 
to the preservation of international peace. Collective security is seen to differ from 
collective self-defence, in that the latter is an inherent right under the UN Charter that 
can be exercised without UN approval, whereas the former is a right that can only be 
exercised if sanctioned by the UN and is for the purposes of collective retaliation by UN 
members against an aggressor (Mochizuki 1997). Japan’s use of the Preamble to justify 
the ATSML and LCSMHRA and JSDF despatch now meshes closely with this collective 
security concept. If Japan were to exercise this latent collective security option in the 
future then it would allow it to participate in all forms of UN-sanctioned security 
activities, including peace enforcement, both in conjunction with and separately from the 
US. Japan’s collective security option could make for expanded US-Japan cooperation in 
a range of UN mandated missions such as that of the Gulf War. But the collective 
security option could also allow Japan, based on UN resolutions, to remove its military 
capabilities from the context and control of the alliance and place these under the control 
of the UN Security Council, and thus actually hamper US-Japan alliance cooperation in 
instances where there is no sufficient UN mandate to act. Hence, even though the 
collective security option may open up a new range of possibilities for JSDF multilateral 
missions, it is for the very reason that these may conflict with bilateral alliance ties, that 
Japan is unlikely to exercise this as the overt basis for its security policy.  
 Instead, Japan is more likely to pursue a second set of radical options opened up for 
its security policy by the ‘war on terror’. Japan may realise in the future an expanded 
multilateral security role in line with precedents of the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
but this is again likely to be within the context of US-centred ad hoc ‘coalitions of the 
willing’, with only a limited veneer of UN legitimisation, rather than more UN-centred 
frameworks that might create alternative multilateral channels for Japan’s military 
power. Japan is indeed learning the habits of multilateral interaction, but this is under 
US instruction and among existing US partners (whether refuelling the UK, transporting 
Thai army equipment, or relying on the Dutch for protection in Iraq), and to empower 
primarily US strategy and interests. The flip-side of this position is that Japan is unlikely 
to learn the substance of multilateralism within its own East Asia region, or as a way to 
temper its dependence upon or bind its US ally. 
 In turn, Japan’s multilateral activity and role in the war on terror in Afghanistan and 
Iraq may serve to further strengthen radically the bilateral alliance with the US. Japan, 
having established the precedent of the expansion of the geographical and functional 
scope of military cooperation with the US in the Afghan context, may find it 
progressively tougher politically to turn down future requests from the US in the 
campaign against terrorism in other theatres. Japan may also find it politically hard to 
sustain the US-Japan alliance while simultaneously placing different, and possibly, seen 
from the US perspective, artificial restrictions on the support that it can provide to the 
US in the Afghan and Iraq conflicts under the ATSML and LCSMHRA and a regional 
contingency under the Shūhen Jitaihō. If another regional crisis were to occur in East 
Asia, the reaction of US and GOJ policy-makers, the latter’s inherent caution not 
withstanding, might be to overtly transfer the principles and expertise acquired in 
drafting the anti-terrorism bill to the bilateral context of the US-Japan alliance and the 
Shūhen Jitaihō. In this instance, the geographical range of the US-Japan Guidelines for 
Defence Cooperation could be greatly, or even limitlessly expanded if the situation 
demands; the JSDF might be able to operate in support of the US on the land territory of 
neighbouring states; and its use of weapons loosened for the protection of its own 
members and US servicemen ‘under its control’—all measures sure to generate intense 
controversy, if not apprehension, among certain East Asian regimes, such as North 
Korea and China. 
 
Conclusion: Japan’s leaning towards a more proactive security role in support of 
the US 
 
Japan’s support for the US and international community in the campaign against 
terrorism has indeed produced mixed signals about the future direction of its security 
policy. There is considerable evidence to suggest that JSDF despatch to the Indian 
Ocean may not be such a notable departure from past patterns of incrementalism. GOJ 
policy-makers continue to exercise extraordinary ingenuity in adhering to traditional 
constitutional and normative restrictions on the despatch of the JSDF, and they retain 
their usual wariness to avoid entrapment in US military strategy in other regional 
contingencies. Japan was ultra-cautious in designing the ATSML and LCSMHRA in 
such a way as to expand the range of possibilities of support for the US, but also to 
retain UN resolutions as the justification for JSDF despatch; to separate these missions 
from the context of the US-Japan security treaty; to limit the mission parameters and 
capabilities of the JSDF to non-combat roles and non-substitution roles for US forces; 
and to hedge round despatch with a variety of set time limits and measures for Diet 
approval. In these ways, GOJ actions in the ‘war on terror’ have been very much in line 
with the past precedent of the Shūhen Jitaihō, which also built in ambiguity with regard 
to Japanese cooperation for the US by emphasising that the scope of the Guidelines was 
functional and not geographical in nature, and thereby also refusing to rule in or out 
Japan’s military support in regional contingencies such as the Taiwan Straits 
(Katzenstein and Okawara 2001/2002: 171-172; Smith 1999: 86-87). Japan has 
attempted once again to elude entrapment in US inspired contingencies regionally and 
globally. 
 However, while GOJ policy-makers may be able to hold to this traditional 
incrementalist line over the short term, this article has also sought to argue that this 
position may prove less tenable over the medium and longer terms. The evidence from 
the speed and substance of Japan’s reaction to 11 September suggests that potentially 
radical trends have been set in train in its military security policy. As noted above, over 
the medium term, the principal trend in Japanese security policy may be for greater US 
pressure for Japan to transfer the provisions of the ATSML to the Shūhen Jitaihō, and 
for Japan to take an ever greater role in US-led multinational ‘coalitions of the willing’. 
Japanese discussions since mid-2003 for the creation of a permanent and single law for 
international peace cooperation and for a segment of the JSDF as a standing force 
dedicated to this purpose point in these types of directions. Such a law might provide 
Japan with a more flexible means for JSDF despatch rather than having to pass a law 
through the Diet for each mission. But the essential purpose of this multinational force in 
serving bilateral alliance aims may not change. For a JSDF force may be available under 
the law for UN-centred missions, but given US-Japan alliance ties and the prevailing 
international political situation it is more likely that its prime purpose would be for 
despatch on US-led multinational coalitions for international peace. Japan would then 
edge towards becoming the ideal ally: providing not just bases and logistical support for 
the sword of US power projection as at present under the security treaty, but also 
providing under an international security cooperation law fully interoperable air, sea, 
and, most importantly, ground forces for the support of US expeditionary warfare on a 
global scale. 
 Moreover, Japan is now increasingly equipped with a policy-making structure that 
may make it a more proactive security actor. It is clear that the ‘normalisers’ are 
increasingly in charge of Japan’s security policy. The Prime Minister’s Office after 11 
September has enhanced its role in coordination among relevant security policy-making 
actors. MOFA has strengthened its bilateral ties with the US policy community; and the 
JDA has elevated its overall role in the policy process; while all the time the JSDF is 
strengthening its bilateral operational contacts with the US. Finally, in a complete turn-
around from the Gulf War, the GOJ experienced almost no meaningful resistance in the 
Diet in passing the ATSML and LCSMHRA. All this may herald a much more rapid and 
substantial Japanese military response in support of the US in future conflict scenarios in 
East Asia as well as globally.  
 Japan may not yet then have totally ‘crossed the Rubicon’ in its security policy as a 
consequence of the ‘war on terror’, but has incrementally put in place many of the 
components of an expanded and more proactive security policy that will enable it to 
make such a radical leap. The trigger for this leap in security policy over the short term 
is most likely to be North Korea. Prime Minister Koizumi’s government has offered 
political and military support to the US in Iraq, in the expectation that the US will 
remain engaged in trilateral efforts with Japan and South Korea, and the Six-Party Talks, 
in order to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem. Japan’s optimum policy for 
dealing with North Korea remains a mix of deterrence and active engagement in the 
hopes of avoiding an unwanted conflict, as shown by Koizumi’s diplomatic visits to 
North Korea in September 2002 and May 2004. Japan will hope to nudge the US back 
towards engagement. But if US patience with engagement fails, North Korea presses 
ahead with its program, and the US turns to other means to resolve the issue, Japan will 
be forced to prioritise its alliance with the US and move towards the full implementation 
of the 1997 revised Guidelines, but this time augmented by the precedents for alliance 
cooperation set in Afghanistan and Iraq. All this then argues that Japan’s future security 
direction is likely to be one towards assuming the status of a more ‘normal’ military 
power, but one operating firmly within the framework of a strengthened US-Japan 
bilateral alliance and US-led coalitions of the willing, which will only further increase 
US dominance over the security landscape of East Asia for the foreseeable future. 
 
Notes 
 
1. James Auer, the former Director of Japan Affairs at the Department of Defence, even 
claimed that Japan’s support for the US after 11 September would be an opportunity to 
make amends for Pearl Harbour. James E. Auer, ‘Japan’s chance to reverse Pearl 
Harbor’, http://www.glocomnet.or.jp/okazaki-inst/pearlhauer.html. 
2. The official English name of the law is: The Special Measures Law Concerning 
Measures Taken by Japan in Support of the Activities of Foreign Countries Aiming to 
Achieve the Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations in Response to the Terrorist 
Attacks Which Took Place on 11 September 2001 in the United States of America as 
well as Concerning Humanitarian Measures Based on Relevant Resolutions of the 
United Nations. 
3. For instance, an opinion survey taken in the Mainichi Shimbun, one of the leading 
Japanese dailies, reported that 63 per cent of respondents were in favour of some form of 
JSDF despatch. In terms of the actual contents of this support provided by the SDF, 56 
per cent favoured non-military support in the form of medical and humanitarian aid for 
refugees, 26 per cent favoured food and transport logistical support for US forces, 6 per 
cent favoured the supply of weapons and ammunition, and 4 per cent Japan’s actual 
participation in combat. Mainichi Shimbun, 25 September 2001, 
http://www.mainichi.co.jp/news/selection/archive/200109/25/20010926k0000m0100690
00c.html. 
4. Interview with Director level official, National Security Policy Division, Foreign 
Policy Bureau, MOFA, Tokyo, 29 March 2002. 
5. Takano Toshiyuki, then Director General of MOFA’s North American Affairs Bureau 
stated in the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs on 13 May 1998 
that the occurrence of a regional contingency in the Middle East or the Indian Ocean 
could not realistically be imagined to be of a degree sufficient to impact on Japan’s own 
security and thus invoke the revised US-Japan Guidelines. Dai142kai Kokkai Shūgiin 
Gaimuiinkai Kaigiroku Dai 11gō, 13 May 1998, p. 9. Prime Minister Obuchi in the 
House of Councilors deliberations on the Shūhen Jitaihō on 28 April 1999 commented 
that while the definition of Japan’s periphery could not be strictly geographically 
defined it did have limits which meant that the Middle East and Indian Ocean were not 
envisaged to be within the scope of the bill for the Shūhen Jitaihō. Dai145kai Kokkai 
Sangiin Honkaigi Kaigiroku Dai 17gō, 28 April 1999, p. 12.  
6. ‘Press Conference by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2003/12/09press_e.html. 
7. Interview with MSDF officer and member of MSDF Staff Office, JDA, Tokyo, 26 
March 2002. 
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